Coup-proofing and civil war by Sudduth, Jun Koga
Sudduth, Jun Koga (2016) Coup-proofing and civil war. In: The Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford Research Encyclopaedias . 
Oxford University Press. , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.27
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/57631/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1  
COUP-PROOFING AND CIVIL WAR 
 







Effects of Coup-Proofing on Civil War 
 Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in International War 
 Coup-Proofing and Civil War 
(IIHFWRI&LYLO:DU7KUHDWVRQ&RXS'¶HWDWV 










Political leaders face threats to their power from both within and outside the regime. Leaders can 
EHUHPRYHGYLDDFRXSG¶HWDWXQGHUWDNHQE\PLOLWDULHVWKDWDUHSDUWRIWKH state apparatus. At 
the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil 
wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them 
vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence 
capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes 
from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail 
against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, 
OHDGHUVZKRFRSHZLWKFRXSWKUHDWVE\ZHDNHQLQJWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶FDSDELOLWLHVWRRUJDQL]HD
coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers.  
 
    This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the 
military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-
proofing. Though most research on this subject IRFXVHGSULPDULO\RQUXOHUV¶PDQHXYHUVWR
balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, a 
more recent scholarship VWDUWHGWRH[SORUHKRZOHDGHUV¶HIIRUWVWRFRSHZLWKFRXS threats will 
LQIOXHQFHWKHUHJLPH¶VDELOLWLHVWRDGGUHVVWKHdomestic threats coming from rebel groups, and 
vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address 
whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries¶ capabilities 
LQFUHDVHWKHUHJLPH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WRUHEHOWKUHDWVDQGWKHIXWXUHSUREDELOLW\RIFLYLOZar. 
Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine 
OHDGHUV¶VWUDWHJLHVWRZDUGWKHPLOLWDULHVDQGKRZWKHVHVWUDWHJLHVDIIHFWERWKWKHPLOLWDULHV¶
influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of 
research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which 
civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups 
have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses 
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Political leaders face threats to their power from both within and outside the regime. 
Leaders can be removed via a FRXSG¶HWDWXQGHUWDNHQE\PLOLWDULHVDQGRWKHUHOLWHVWKDWDUH
part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded 
opposition groups in civil wars. Leaders thus need to simultaneously cope with threats posed by 
militaries and threats coming from rebel groups in order to maximize their chances of political 
survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them 
vulnerable to the other threat due to the role and ability of the military as an institution of 
violence capable of exercising coercive power (Feaver, 1999). On one hand, leaders need to 
protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are 
strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup 
successfully.  Therefore, militaries can become powerful threats to leaders. On the other 
KDQGOHDGHUVZKRFRSHZLWKFRXSWKUHDWVE\ZHDNHQLQJWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶FDSDELOLWLHVWR
organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel 
challengers. 
 This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the 
military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-
proofing (Feaver, 1999; Quinlivan, 1999). Most research on this subject, though, focused 
SULPDULO\RQUXOHUV¶PDQHXYHUVWREDODQFHWKHWKUHDWVSRVHGE\WKHPLOLWDU\DQGWKH threats 
coming from foreign adversaries rather than domestic enemies. Recently, however, an 
HPHUJLQJVFKRODUVKLSKDVVWDUWHGWRH[SORUHKRZOHDGHUV¶HIIRUWVWRFRSHZLWKFRXS threats 
ZLOOLQIOXHQFHWKHUHJLPH¶VDELOLWLHVWRDGGUHVVWKHdomestic threats coming from rebel groups, 
and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars 
address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries 
capabilities increase WKHUHJLPH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WRUHEHOWKUHDts and the future probability of 
civil war (Roessler, 2011). Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by 
rebel JURXSVZLOOGHWHUPLQHOHDGHUV¶VWUDWHJLHVWRZDUGWKHPLOLWDULHV and how these strategies 
4  
DIIHFWERWKWKHPLOLWDULHV¶LQIOXHQFHRYHUgovernment policy and the future probability of coup 
onsets (Acemoglu et al., 2010a; Svolik, 2013). 
These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by considering the 
interactions between intra-state conflict, leadership survival and political stability. As 
described above, coups and civil war are distinct concepts. Coup perpetrators are the military 
or other regime elites coming from within the central state apparatus, while civil war is 
conflict between the government and opposition groups excluded from power (Powell and 
Thyne 2011). Scholars of intrastate conflict, however, have often ignored their distinction 
and conflated coups with civil war if they exceed the minimal death threshold for the civil 
war dataset (Thyne 2016). Recently more scholars have started to recognize a pitfall of 
conflating coups with civil war (e.g., Hultquist 2013) as well as the importance of 
systematically exploring a relationship between coups and civil war (Roessler 2011). The 
literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of 
each other (Sambanis, 2004), and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just 
begun (Bell and Sudduth, 2015). Studies that I overview below have looked into the question of 
ZKHWKHUOHDGHUV¶HIIRUWVWRFRSHZLWKRQHWKUHDWPLJKWDFWXDOO\LQIOXHQFHWKHVHYHULW\RIWKHRWKHU
These findings increase our understanding of intrastate conflict by examining the causal 
mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. 
,QWKLVUHYLHZ,ILUVWGHILQHWKHFRQFHSWRI³FRXS-proofing" strategies and discuss the 
impacts of these strategies on future coup risk. I then introduce the literature that addresses how 
OHDGHUV¶DWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVFRXSWKUHDWVFRXOGLQIOXHQFHWKHUHJLPH¶VDELOLWLHVWRGHIHQGWKH
regime against rebellions. I also examine the literature that focuses on how rebel threats 
LQIOXHQFHOHDGHUV¶VWUDWHJLHVWRZDUGPLOLWDULHVDQGIXWXUHFRXSWKUHDWV)LQDOO\,GHVFULEHVRPHRI






Leaders can cope with coup threats via two mechanisms. First, leaders can thwart any coup threats 
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by diminishing their PLOLWDULHV¶capabilities to organize a successful overthrow. Second, 
leaders can provide more resources or benefits to their militaries and thus diminish their 
willingness WRFKDOOHQJHWKHOHDGHUV,QWKLVUHYLHZDUWLFOH,XVHWKHWHUP³FRXS-proofing" to 
refer to the former strategies that are associated with reducing WKHPLOLWDULHV¶FRXS-making 
capabilities. As I will describe below, there is a consensus in the literature that increasing 
resources to militaries also increases their capabilities to carry out a coup successfully, thereby 
ZRUVHQLQJOHDGHUV¶SRVLWLRQVYLV-à-vis their militaries. In this section, I will lay out the logic 
EHKLQGHDFKVWUDWHJ\DQGGLVFXVVWKHOLWHUDWXUH¶VILQGLQJV about the causes and consequences of each 
strategy. 
 
Current research points out that there are several strategies that allow leaders to reduce 
PLOLWDULHV¶DELOLWLHVWRVXFFHVVIXOO\RUJDQL]HDFRXS%elkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and 
Bohmelt, 2012). Such strategies include, for example, counterbalancing by dividing the 
military into multiple rival forces (Welch, 1976; Belkin and Schofer, 2003), creating parallel 
militaries that counter-balance the regular armed forces (Quinlivan, 1999; First, 1970), rotating 
command positions frequently (Pollack, 2002) and purging rival military officers (Biddle and 
Zirkle, 1996; Pollack, 1996). These strategies represent structural obstacles that will decrease the 
incentives of military officers to organize a coup.  For example, leaders counter-balance their 
militaries into mutually suspicious rival organizations that check and balance each other.  In 
addition, they may create paramilitary organizations with command structures that are different 
from the regular army for the purpose of establishing a counter-weight to the regular armed forces 
(Belkin and Schofer, 2005). Such counterbalancing measures prevents any single part of the 
military from becoming too strong while also increasing the difficulty for any particular 
military unit to carry out a coup in the presence of other rival military and paramilitary forces 
that may be unwilling to join the coup-makers. Another way that leaders ensure their political 
survival is to divide the military into multiple rival forces, frequently rotate their military 
commanders and limit inter-branch communication and joint training exercises ± all of which 
GHFUHDVHVWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶DELOLWLHVWRFRRUGLQDWHDFWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHPBiddle and Zirkle, 1996; 
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Pollack, 2002; Powell, 2012; Welch, 1976). Finally, using their control over the intelligence 
organs, leaders monitor rivals within the regime, detect plots and punish the disloyal.  Once 
leaders have purged enough rivals from the regime and secured key positions for their loyal 
followers, the remaining officers who are critical of the leaders find themselves too weak to 
successfully stage a coup (Svolik, 2009; Roessler, 2011). 
 However, not all leaders will pursue coup-proofing strategies.  Scholars argue that only 
those leaders who have higher threat perceptions associated with coup risk will tend to employ 
these measures. In their comparison of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and North Vietnam in the 
Second Indochina War, Biddle and Zirkle (1996) found that the higher threat of coup 
replacement in Iraq created powerful incentives for Saddam Hussein to engage in purges, 
replace his military officers frequently and create paramilitary organizations. On the other 
hand, leaders in North Vietnam who had low threat perceptions, relaxed their political 
controls over their militaries. Belkin and Schofer (2005SJVLPLODUO\DUJXHWKDW³ZKHQ 
WKHULVNRIDFRXSG¶HWDWLVperceived to be high, leaders almost always divide their armed 
forces into multiple organizations that check and balance each other and protect the regime", 
while the perception of ³KLJK coup risk is usually sufficient to cause leaders to" take these coup-
proofing strategies. Pilster and Bohmelt (2012) echo this view claiming that autocracies are 
more likely to adopt coup-proofing strategies mainly because autocratic leaders are more 
YXOQHUDEOHWRFRXSG¶HWDWs. 
Another strand of research involving coup-proofing deals with whether such strategies 
actually reduce the future likelihood of coup occurrence and success. Various case studies 
suggest that rulers, for example, in the Middle Eastern states such as Iraq, Egypt, Syria and 
Yemen have become less vulnerable to coup threats over time due to their OHDGHUV¶ extensive 
use of coup-proofing measures (Quinlivan, 1999; Makara, 2013). Recent quantitative analyses, 
however, offer somewhat mixed results. Roessler (2011) shows that purging rival elites and their 
co-ethnic groups from the regime will reduce the probability of coup attempts in sub-Saharan 
African states. Powell (2012) finds that the size of paramilitary personnel relative to regular 
army personnel has a negative effect on both coup attempts and coup success, while the 
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counterbalancing measure in terms of the number of effective military organizations has no 
effect on coups. Meanwhile, Bohmelt and Pilster (2015) find that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between counterbalancing and the likelihood of coup attempt, although there is no 
relationship between counterbalancing and coup success. 
As stated earlier, leaders can also provide militaries with an increased amount of 
material, financial and political resources which reduce their willingness to challenge leaders 
(Huntington, 1991; Powell, 2012). That is, when militaries are largely dissatisfied with 
incumbent leaders, the leaders might want to prevent these discontented officers from 
launching a coup by providing them with spoils. Spoiling, however, can inFUHDVHPLOLWDULHV¶
capabilities to organize a coup successfully and eventually to increase both WKHPLOLWDULHV¶
influence over politics and the possibility of coup attempts (Acemoglu et al., 2010b; Svolik, 
2013), though it could prevent an immediate risk of coup. Since militaries with larger 
material and political resources are better equipped for taking strategic locations and staging a 
coup, added resources only increases their capabilities to conduct a coup successfully (Powell, 
2012; Acemoglu et al., 2010b; Svolik, 2013). Quantitative empirical evidence confirms this 
argument by showing that there is a positive relationship between militaries with higher military 
expenditures or funding and the probability of successful coups (Wang, 1998; Powell, 2012). 
Since militaries are more likely to stage a coup when their officers believe that there is 
a high chance of success (e.g Nordlinger, 1977; Galetovic and Sanhueza, 2000), they are also 
likely to engage in coup attempts when they become dissatisfied with their incumbent leaders, 
especially in light of their enhanced resources  (Acemoglu et al., 2010b; Svolik, 2013). When 
leDGHUVSUHSDUHWRGRZQVL]HWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶SURPLVHGVSRLOVRUUHVRXUFHVPLOLWDULHVZLOOEH
motivated to overthrow them preemptively in order to protect their organizational interests  
(Acemoglu et al., 2010b). In autocracies, the situation is exacerbated by the lack of precise 
LQIRUPDWLRQWKDWPLOLWDULHVKDYHDERXWWKHLUOHDGHUV¶SROLFLHVDQGIXWXUHSODQV&RQVHTXHQWO\
military officers may misperceive that their governments are failing to comply with their 
promises to provide them with institutional resources when in actuality they are not. The 







Effect of Coup-Proofing on Conflict  
 
/HDGHUV¶HIIRUWVWRFRSHZLWKFRXSWKUHDWVE\ZHDNHQLQJWKHPLOLWDULHV¶FDSDELOLWLHVWR
organize a coup also tend to weaken their PLOLWDULHV¶capabilities to confront threats from 
opposition groups outside of the regime.  A large number of coup-proofing studies have 
focused on whether these strategies have influenced the military effectiveness of countries 
who are involved in interstate war. Recently, scholars, in an effort to build on this earlier 
research, have started to H[SORUHKRZOHDGHUV¶FRXS-proofing efforts might influence a UHJLPH¶V
vulnerability to the onset of rebellions or mass protests. In this section, I will first provide an 
overview of the scholarly work on coup-proofing and military effectiveness in the context of 
international war. I will then examine newer studies that focus on the linkage between coup-
proofing and the severity of rebel threats. 
 
Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in International War 
 
6FKRODUVKDYHORQJDUJXHGWKDWOHDGHUV¶FRXS-proofing strategies are costly in the sense that 
WKH\XQGHUPLQHWKHPLOLWDULHV¶ILJKWLQJFDSDELOLWLHVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOZDUDQGWKHUHIRUHOHDYH 
countries more vulnerable to threats emanating from foreign enemies. How does this happen?  
First, coup-proofing WDFWLFVDUHFRQVLGHUHGWRKDYHGHWULPHQWDOHIIHFWVRQVROGLHUV¶OHDGHUVKLS
qualities. Recruitment and promotion of officers based on political loyalty rather than merit 
and competence discourage officers from developing the necessary leadership skills that are 
required to wage wars successfully (Brooks, 1998; Quinlivan, 1999). Frequent rotation of 
military commanders is also considered to prevent them from establishing cohesive ties with 
their troops and enlisted personnel. Related to this point, Reiter and Stam (2002) argue that 
RIILFHUV¶OHDGHUVKLSVNLOOVDUH more advanced in democratic countries mainly because civilian 
leaders who are not concerned about coup attempts can rely on a merit-based selection process for 
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military officers.  
Second, coup-proofing strategies can also undermine the PLOLWDULHV¶effectiveness on the 
battlefield (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996). When leaders divide their militaries into rival 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGSUHYHQWGLIIHUHQWXQLWVIURPWUDLQLQJWRJHWKHUWKH\UHGXFHWKHPLOLWDULHV¶
ability to establish inter-branch communications and regular interactions that are necessary to 
achieve successful coordinated actions during military operations. Finally, scholars maintain 
WKDWOHDGHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRLQYHVWLQWKHH[SDQVLRQRIDFRXS-proofing apparatus such as 
paramilitary or police forces can undermine regular army capabilities by redirecting 
important resources away from them (Powell, 2014). 
 Two often-cited examples that demonstrate the correlation between coup-proofing and poor 
military performances are Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Libya under Muammar Gaddaffi. 
Saddam promoted officers primarily on the basis of political loyalty and at times punished 
competent officers to prevent them from becoming too strong. He also restricted training and 
communication among his commanders and developed an intelligence apparatus that was directed 
at his own forces. Consequently, the Iraqi military performed poorly, displaying little ability 
to conduct complex operations in both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War (Talmadge, 2013; 
Biddle and Zirkle, 1996; Quinlivan, 1999). Like Saddam, Gaddafi is also known to have relied on 
strategies such as promotions based on ethnic and religious affiliation rather than on merit, 
frequent rotations of officers, creation of a large parallel security apparatus and restrictions on 
inter-branch joint training, all of which led to poor battlefield performance in its conflict with 
Chad (Pollack, 2002; Gaub, 2013). 
Recent quantitative analyses also provide evidence for the negative effects of  
counterbalancing measures on military effectiveness in international war. Using data of attacker-
defender pairs involved in military engagement between 1965 and 1999, Pilster and Bohmelt 
(2011) ILQGWKDWWKHKLJKHUWKHDWWDFNHU¶VHQJDJHPHQWLQFRXS-proofing strategies relative to 
the defender, the higher the number of attackers killed per defender killed. Thus, coup-
proofing strategies UHGXFHDFRXQWU\¶VPLOLWDU\HIIHFWLYHQHVVLQWHUPVRIWKHPLOLWDU\¶VFDSDELOLWLHV
that are required WRGHVWUR\WKHRSSRQHQW¶VIRUFHVZKLOHSUHVHUYLQJLWVRZQWURRSV 
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Powell (2014) theorizes that coup-SURRILQJ¶VLQIOXHQFHRQPLOLWDU\HIIHFWLYHQHVVKDV
another important effect on international conflict. Linking coup-proofing arguments to a 
diversionary theory of conflict, Powell asserts that as coup-proofing measures reduce both coup 
risk and military effectiveness, they also decrease the utility of diversionary conflicts in autocratic 
regimes. That is, coup-SURRILQJWDFWLFVZLOOUHGXFHOHDGHUV¶QHHGVWRLQLWLDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQIOLFW
for a diversionary purpose. Using global data from 1962-2000, he finds that the negative impact of 
coup vulnerability on conflict initiation decreases as counterbalancing measures increase. 
Meanwhile, recent research links coup-proofing and military effectiveness to how well 
regimes compensate for their self-induced military weaknesses. Brown et al. (2015) argue that 
political leaders can adopt other policies that provide defense against foreign enemies without 
requiring them to relax their coup-SURRILQJPHDVXUHV7KHVH³VWUDWHJLFVXEVWLWXWHV´LQFOXGH
the development of weapons of mass destruction and the creation of alliances to balance 
against the military power of other states. Their findings imply that while conventional 
wisdom suggests that coup-proofing leaves states vulnerable to foreign threats, the outlook for 
security in coup-prone states might not be so dire: Leaders who have weakened their militaries 
and coup-proofed the regime can rely on substitution policies to offset their battlefield weakness. 
The quantitative analysis using global data between 1970 and 2001 supports their argument. 
             On a related point, recent studies on autocracies and international war suggest that 
military defeats are not necessarily costly for leaders in coup-proofed regimes, because these leaders 
face few domestic consequences (LHFRXS³SXQLVKPHQWfor military defeats or the initiation of 
unwise conflicts (Weeks, 2008, 2012). In other words, when autocratic leaders do not confront a 
credible threat of coup punishment, their militaries will not or cannot hold them accountable for 
their policy failures.  
+RZHYHUVRPHVFKRODUVSRLQWRXWWKDWPLOLWDU\GHIHDWVVRPHWLPHVOHDGWROHDGHUV¶
removal from power.  Thus, when  autocratic leaders realize that military defeats pose a threat 
to their political survival, they are likely to end their reliance on coup-proofing measures in 
RUGHUWRHQKDQFHWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶ILJKWLQJFDSDELOLWLHV)RULQVWDQFHTalmadge (2013) argues 
that the improvements in Iraqi military effectiveness during the last stages of the Iran-Iraq War 
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resulted from shifts in Saddam +XVVHLQ¶Vthreat perceptions. Once Saddam realized that 
losing the war against Iran might result in his removal from power, either by the Iranians or 
his own frustrated officer corps, he shifted away from coup-proofing policies and started to 
LPSURYHWKHPLOLWDULHV¶ILJKWLQJFDSDELOLWLHVE\SURPRWLQg officers on merit and encouraging 
active communication and training among his commanders. The change in 6DGGDP¶V policies, 
Talmadge explains, resulted in rapid improvements in the Iraqi military performance during 1987-
88. 
 
Coup-Proofing and Civil War 
 
Though very few in number, some scholars have explored WKHOLQNEHWZHHQOHDGHUV¶ coup-
proofing efforts and their UHJLPHV¶YXOQHUDELOLW\WRUHEHOOLRQV5oessler, 2011; Powell, 2015). 
They DUJXHWKDWOHDGHUV¶HIIRUWVWRZHDNHQWKHPLOLWDU\¶VFRXS-making capabilities will in turn 
ZRUVHQWKHUHJLPHV¶SRVLWLRQVYLV-a-vis rebel groups, thereby increasing the probability of 
civil war in the longer-term. Facing high threats of coups, these rulers have chosen a political 
strategy that substitutes civil war risk for coup risk (Roessler, 2011; De Bruin, 2014). 
Roessler (2011) shows that while coup-IHDULQJOHDGHUV¶WDFWLFVWRH[FOXGHWKHLUULYDOHOLWHV
and their coethnics from the highest levels of government reduces the risk of coups from 
within the regime, they nonetheless increase the risk of a future civil war from these targeted 
groups outside the regime.  Tactics of ethnic exclusion will facilitate both insurgency 
IRUPDWLRQDQGXQGHUPLQHWKHUHJLPH¶V counterinsurgency capabilities for several reasons.  As 
former regime insiders, excluded elites can use their experiences and skills to raise the political 
consciousness of potential dissidents within the excluded group and to organize rebel groups. 
Individuals from excluded ethnic groups are also motivated to join the rebels in order to 
secure protection from state repression and indiscriminate violence. Moreover, these purged 
elites might be willing to leverage their insider knowledge and information about government 
operations to obtain financial and military support from neighboring governments. 
%HVLGHVSRVVLEO\IRPHQWLQJLQVXUJHQFLHVHWKQLFH[FOXVLRQDOVRZHDNHQVWKHUHJLPH¶V
counterinsurgency capabilities because it undermines ethnic brokerage networks that the 
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government relies on to ensure stability. Without access to locally trusted ethnic brokers, the 
regime risks the loss of local support as well as valuable information about rebel activities. 
Ethnic exclusion also undermines the UHJLPH¶VWHUULWRULDOFRQWUROJLYHQWKHJHRJUDSKLF
concentration of ethnic groups, allowing the insurgents enough space to organize military 
operations. In support of these arguments, Roessler (2011) finds that in sub-Saharan African 
countries, ethnic exclusion significantly increases the likelihood of rebellions, while it reduces a 
JURXS¶VDELOLW\WR carry out a successful coup. 
Powell (2015) DOVRDJUHHVZLWKWKHYLHZWKDWOHDGHUV¶FRXS-proofing strategies have a 
neJDWLYHHIIHFWRQDUHJLPH¶VPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLWLHVWRILJKWUHEHOOLRQVwhich in turn increases 
the likelihood of civil war onset. He argues that the militaries in coup-proofed regimes will 
perform poorly in counterinsurgency operations for similar reasons that they are likely to 
SHUIRUPSRRUO\LQLQWHUVWDWHZDUV/HDGHUV¶WDFWLFVWKDWGLYLGHWKHDUPHGIRUFHVDQGIRUELG
inter-branch communications create coordination challenges in military operations. 
Meanwhile, their creation of paramilitary organizations to prevent coups will redirect needed 
resources away from the regular armed forces.  In some cases, their paramilitary 
organizations are more capable than the armed forces, but leaders are unwilling to use them 
in military operations in order to secure their political survival. In addition, Powell (2015) 
argues that coup-proofing strategies that result in loyalty-based promotions reduces the 
overall quality of the regular armed forces as well as their abilities to use advanced weapon 
systems effectively. Empirically, Powell does not directly test the effect of coup-proofing 
VWUDWHJLHVRQWKHUHJLPH¶V military effectiveness in civil war. Instead, he examines whether 
OHDGHUV¶FRXS-proofing efforts in the past increase the onset of civil war. Using data with 49 
states from northern and sub-Saharan Africa from 1970 to 2000, he shows that counterbalancing 
efforts, which are measured by the number of effective organizations, have an increasing 
effect on the likelihood of civil war onset in the country. 
Besides quantitative evidence, case studies also support these theoretical claims.  For 
instance, sFKRODUVDWWULEXWHWKH,UDTLPLOLWDULHV¶SRRUEDWWOHILHOGSHUIRUPDQFHVLQWKHir fight 
against ISIS in 2014 to ,UDTLUXOHUV¶coup-proofing strategies (De Bruin, 2014; Fraiman et al., 
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2014). In order to insulate himself from coup threats, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
expanded security forces in the Interior Ministry to offset the strength of the army and 
SURPRWHGVROGLHUVZKRZHUHSHUVRQDOO\OR\DOWRKLP7KHVHPHDVXUHVXQGHUPLQHGVROGLHUV¶
morale and made it difficult for multiple forces to coordinate their military actions effectively 
(De Bruin, 2014). $QRWKHUH[DPSOHLV8JDQGD¶V3UHVLGHQW<RZHUL0XVHYHQLZKRLQKLV
HIIRUWVWRSURWHFWKLPVHOIIURPFRXSWKUHDWVKDPSHUHGWKH8JDQGDQDUP\¶VFDSDELOLWLHVWR
fight local insurgencies successfully. After Museveni came to power in 1986, he established 
parallel military organizations and other security agencies in order to counterbalance the 
regular military forces and to monitor each other (Rwengabo, 2012). Museveni also prioritised 
personal loyalty at the expense of military professionalism and competence. These techniques, 
according to Espeland and Petersen (2010), contributed to the poor battlefield performance by the 
8JDQGD3HRSOH¶V'HIHQFH)RUFHV83')LQits protracted war against the /RUG¶V5HVLVWDQFH
Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. 
 7KHUHLVDOVRHYLGHQFHLQWKH$UDE6SULQJFDVHVZKHUHVFKRODUVKDYHDUJXHGWKDWOHDGHUV¶
prior efforts to address coup threats had important consequences on their abilities to defend against 
mass protests and uprisings. In particular, military defections from the Egyptian and Tunisian 
UHJLPHVGXULQJWKH$UDE6SULQJKDYHEHHQOLQNHGGLUHFWO\WRWKHVHUHJLPHV¶FRXS-proofing tactics 
(Nepstad, 2013). Makara (2013), for example, argues that when leaders engaged in building 
parallel militaries and multiple layers of security services while also providing material incentives 
WRWKHPWKH\FUHDWHG³ZLQQHUV´DQG³ORVHUV within their security apparatus, thereby 
encouraging losers to defect from the regime.  Similarly, Brooks (2013) argues that the 
7XQLVLDQPLOLWDU\¶VGHIHFWLRQIURPWKH%HQ$OLUHJLPHLVDWWULEXWDEOHWR%HQ$OL¶VFRXS-proofing 
strategies of weakening his militaries by countering them with strong paramilitary forces. Ben Ali 
marginalized his PLOLWDU\RIILFHUV¶SRVLWLRQLQWKHUHJLPHDQGHQVXUHGWKDWWKHPLOLWDU\UHPDLQHG
small and poorly funded.  At that same time, he invested in and empowered police and security 
IRUFHVZLWKLQWKH,QWHULRU0LQLVWU\LQRUGHUWRRIIVHWWKHPLOLWDU\¶VSRZHUDQGLnfluence. As a 
result, the Tunisian military officers, when faced with a mass uprising in January 2011, had 
very little to lose from abandoning Ben Ali (See also Barany (2011)). *DXE¶Vanalysis 
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RIWKH/LE\DQPLOLWDU\¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKHXSULVLQJDOVROLQNV*DGGDIL¶VGHFDGH-long coup-
proofing measures to military defection. *DGGDIL¶VSHQFKDQWIRUIUHTXHQWO\URWDWLQJKLV
military commanders, hiring and promoting officers based on loyalty and creating 
SDUDPLOLWDU\IRUFHVQRWRQO\ZHDNHQHGWKH/LE\DQPLOLWDU\¶VOHDGHUVKLSDQGILJKWLQJFDSDFLW\
against the rebels but they also led to a large scale military defection. 
Contrary to the aforementioned literature, some scholars propose that some types of coup-
proofing strategies (military purges) reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence by 
demonstrating the strength of the regime.  Focusing on the post-civil war environment, 
Braithwaite and Sudduth (2016) claim that the removal of high-ranking military officials 
deters subsequent domestic unrest by demonstrating the capacity of the regime to remove 
powerful yet undesirable individuals from the regime. Using the data on military purges 
created by Sudduth (2014), they show that purges of military officers in autocracies decrease 
the probability of civil war recurrence. 
(IIHFWRI&LYLO:DU7KUHDWVRQ&RXS'¶etats 
 
The other difficult situation for leaders arises when they face serious threats from those 
excluded from political power. Another line of recent research explores whether the presence 
of severe threats from rebels (or politically excluded groups) encourages leaders to strengthen 
their militaries, inadvertently increasing the probability of coup attempts  (Acemoglu et al., 
2010a,b; Svolik, 2013). Since the military is the only coercive force that is capable of 
defeating rebellions successfully, leaders invest more resources in strengthening the 
capabilities of their militaries only to confront the problem of stronger military institutions 
that can overthrow their regime. As discussed earlier, leaders face a double-edged sword 
since an empowered military that is able to defeat rebel groups is also capable of successfully 
ousting its leaders through coups. Consequently, as the severity of rebel threats increases, 
militaries can exert a greater influence on local politics by threatening to stage a coup and 
imposing their preferences on policy outcomes. 
In fact, a coup is more likely to happen when leaders are unable to make commitments 
to maintaining military benefits in the future. Acemoglu et al. (2010b), for example, asserts 
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that the risk of a coup is greatest when civilian governments cannot make commitments to 
avoid downsizing the military once a civil war is over. The scenario is that newly empowered 
militaries will preempt such downsizing by resorting to coups  (Acemoglu et al., 2010b). In 
order to avoid this possibility, leaders may choose to build an  ³RYHU-sized" army in order to 
signal their commitment that they will not reform the military because it is strong enough to 
withstand their attempts to downsize it in the future. Therefore, when the risk of civil war is 
high, there are two possible outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2010b). One is, a leader will build an 
over-sized military which is strong enough to defeat the rebels, but is also strong enough to 
discourage leaders from downsizing it later. The result is that a leader will avoid coups and 
remain in power but with a very influential military. The other scenario is that a leader will 
choose to form an intermediate-sized army that is strong enough to defeat the rebels, only to 
FRQIURQWDKLJKHUULVNRIDFRXSG¶HWDWEHFDXVHWKHPLOLWDU\LVOLNHly to perceive threats to its 
institutional interests in the post-civil war period. On the other hand, when leaders face low 
threats from civil war (especially if their rents are unaffected by an ongoing war), they will 
choose to rely on a weak army that is incapable of ending the civil war. As a result, a 
prolonged war will ensue. 
Svolik (2013) similarly argues that when the military becomes sufficiently empowered with 
large resources, it can extract policy agreements  for greater political autonomy and influence 
over domestic policies in return for suppressing mass internal uprisings. If the government 
UHQHJHVRQLWVSURPLVHVWKHPLOLWDU\LVLQDSRVLWLRQWRWKUHDWHQDFRXSG¶HWDWSo, leaders are 
more likely to be deterred from breaking their commitments when their militaries become 
stronger with greater resources. In addition, leaders are more likely to enrich their militaries 
when the threat of mass uprisings is high. Hence, the probability of military coups will 
diminish. Meanwhile, when the threats from mass uprisings are low, militaries will lack the 
resources to stage a successful coup which reduces their incentives to try it.  As a 
consequence, the likelihood of military coups is considered to be greatest at the intermediate 
levels of mass threats because this is where WKHPLOLWDU\¶VUHVRXUFHVDUHODUJHHQRXJKIRU it to 
be willing to risk coups but not sufficiently large to deter the government from completely 
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reneging on its concessions. The likelihood of military coups, thus, has a non-monotonic, 
inverse U-shaped relationship to the magnitude of the threat posed by politically excluded groups. 
Subjecting his argument to an empirical quantitative test, Svolik (2013) finds that the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIPLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLQSROLWLFVDVPHDVXUHGE\WKHPLOLWDU\¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ
the entry and exit of civilian leaders, is greatest at the intermediate levels of economic 
inequality, which is a proxy for the magnitude of threats that emanate from politically 
excluded groups. 
In a related piece, Acemoglu et al. (2010a) claim that the military plays an important role in 
democratic transitions. Prior to a democratic transition, autocratic elites, in an effort to maintain 
their privileged economic and political positions, create a powerful military for the purpose of 
repressing domestic opposition groups. Unfortunately, a powerful military makes it difficult for a 
regime to undertake a democratic transition because of the increased likelihood that it will engage in 
a coup. At this stage, the military distrusts civilian leaders who cannot or will not commit to 
maintaining the continuity of its role and resources. This distrust or commitment problem is 
exacerbated when the military comes to the realization that a democratic government is unlikely to 
need a strong military to repress internal challengers. Faced with the prospect of a diminished 
future, the military will overthrow the emerging democratic regime and install a military 
dictatorship. 
However, other scholars argue that increased external threats to the regime will increase 
civilian control over the military and decrease the likelihood of a FRXSG¶HWDW (McMahon and 
Slantchev, 2015). The key departure point of this argument from previous studies is the 
assumption that external threat, either foreign or domes- tic, will not magically disappear, 
even after an empowered military overthrows the leaders via a coup. That is, even if a 
military ousts its leader, it will still have to deal with the ongoing threats posed by foreign 
enemies or internal rebels. Therefore, the military has to consider executing a coup 
successfully while subsequently defeating its external challengers.  These twin challenges 
DFWXDOO\UHGXFHWKHPLOLWDU\¶VLQFHQWLYHVWRUHVRUWWRDFRXS&RQVHTXHQWO\ZKHQH[WHUQDO
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threats are high, rulers will empower their military forces with larger resources without the 
fear that they will stage a coup. McMahon and Slantchev (2015) conclude that it is the severity 
of external threats, rather than the mere presence of threats, that permits rulers to strengthen their 
militaries without triggering a coup.  
Still another view is that despite these external threats, the military might consider that it is 
better off dispensing with its leaders and dealing with the remaining threats by itself. Bell and 
Sudduth (2015) focus on how the presence of an ongoing civil war influences the potential coup 
SORWWHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRDWWHPSWDFRXS7KH\PDLQWDLQWKDWDQRQJRLQJZDUincreases the likelihood 
of coups primarily because of its influence on the SORWWHUV¶disposition to conduct a coup 
rather than their capabilities to organize a successful coup. Coup plotters juxtapose 
their satisfaction with the incumbent leader against the perceived benefits and risks associated with 
a coup attempt. High dissatisfaction with maintaining the status quo leaves potential plotters 
more favorably disposed toward coup attempts because the consequences of inaction are less 
favorable. Ongoing civil war, according to Bell and Sudduth (2015), will greatly diminish 
PLOLWDULHV¶VDWLVIDFWLRQVZLWKWKHVWDWXVTXREHFDXVHRIZDUWLPHKDUGVKLSVDQGWKHXQFHUWDLQW\
surrounding the survival of the incumbent government. Thus, plotters are more likely to launch a 
coup during an ongoing war especially when they face strong rebel groups that pose greater threats 
to the government¶VVXUYLYDO. 
An extension of this logic implies that war-time coup attempts are less likely to 
succeed than those attempted during peaceful periods because potential plotters who are 
highly dissatisfied with the status quo are more willing to undertake greater risks.  This 
expectation differs from earlier arguments which assert that leaders will empower their militaries 
with larger resources when faced with external threats, thereby increasing the likelihood that their 
militaries will be successful in overthrowing their leaders.  Bell and Sudduth (2015) test their 
arguments with global data from 1950 to 2011 and find strong evidence for them.  Specifically, 
their results show that: 1) the presence of ongoing civil war increases the probability of coup 
attempts, yet 2) decreases the probability that an attempted coup will succeed, and 3) the more 
severe the threat to the regime as measured by rebel strength and the location of the war zone, the 
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more likely that a war-time coup will occur. 
Next, McMahon and Slantchev (2015) theorize about how external threats to a regime 
could influence coup threats by stressing the role of asymmetric information between political 
leaders and their militaries about the level of threat that the regime faces.  Since militaries have 
access to superior intelligence and information processing when they estimate potential dangers to 
the regime, they may have divergent beliefs from their leaders about the level of the external 
threat. In cases where leaders overestimate the threats, they are likely to overfund their militaries 
which will increase their ability to defeat government challengers but also increase the probability 
RIDFRXS+HQFH0F0DKRQDQG6ODQWFKHYPDLQWDLQWKDWLWLVWKHOHDGHU¶VXQFHUWDLQty about 
the level of external threats, rather than the presence of the threat itself, that makes them 
YXOQHUDEOHWRFRXSG¶HWDWV 
Informational asymmetry between leaders and their militaries also increases the uncertainty 
between them, especially since leaders are likely to have private information about their policy 
choices.  Knowing this and lacking the policy expertise and experience in policymaking, militaries 
may misread whether their leaders are complying with an agreed upon policy or compromise. 
SvoOLNFODLPVWKDWWKLVXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWHDFKVLGH¶VPRWLYHVFRPSOLFDWHVWKHFRPPLWPHQW
problem between rulers and their militaries.  Rulers might be tempted to break their promises to 
their militaries, while militaries suspect that their rulers are looking for opportunities to renege on 
WKHP(LWKHUVFHQDULRDIIHFWVPLOLWDULHV¶FDOFXODWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQDFRXS 
 
The Way Forward 
 
 $OORIWKLVSULRUGLVFXVVLRQVKRZVWKDWV\VWHPDWLFUHVHDUFKRQKRZOHDGHUV¶VWUDWHJLHV
toward their militaries influence whether they can survive the twin threats of military coups 
and rebel insurrections has just begun. Significantly more work is needed to develop theoretical 
ideas and test individual hypotheses. One important issue for future research is to assess whether 
WKHWLPLQJRIOHDGHUV¶FRXS-proofing actions influences coup behavior. Existing studies stress the 
scenario that leaders who face high FRXSWKUHDWVDUHOLNHO\WRGLPLQLVKWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶FRXS-
making capabilities in order to reduce these risks. However, they overlook the possibility that the 
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enactment of coup-proofing actions might actually prompt the militaries to launch a coup in order 
to pre-HPSWWKHLUOHDGHUV¶HIIRUWVWRZHDNHQWKHP(Nordlinger, 1977; Zartman, 1970; Sudduth 
2014). This point indicates that the relationship between coup threats and coup-proofing actions is 
not as simple as H[LVWLQJVWXGLHVVXJJHVW([SORULQJZKHQOHDGHUVFDQUHGXFHWKHLUPLOLWDULHV¶
capabilities without precipitating a coup would help uncover the dynamics of coup-proofing and 
WKHUHJLPH¶VFRQVROLGDWLRQRISRZHU 
Relatedly, more data gathering on various types of coup-proofing actions is necessary in 
order to subject existing theories and hypotheses to more systematic testing. Quantitative studies 
on coup-proofing typically utilize counterbalancing variables originally created by Belkin 
and Schofer (2003) and later improved by Pilster and Bohmelt (2012). These variables are 
based on military and paramilitary force data from the Military Balance which is published 
annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. However, counterbalancing strategies 
such as increasing paramilitary forces and/or the divisions of militaries are just one type of many 
coup-proofing tactics that leaders utilize according to qualitative research. In addition, some 
scholars suggest that there are inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the Military Balance data 
ZKLFKUHIOHFWWKHYDULDWLRQDPRQJLQGLYLGXDOFRXQWU\H[SHUWV¶GHILQLWLRQs and interpretations of the 
variables (De Bruin, 2015). Therefore, higher quality data that identify different types of coup-
proofing actions would be a meaningful next stepSome scholarly efforts in this direction are 
already emerging. Roessler (2011), for instance, introduced the data on ethnic exclusion that 
identifies when a particular ethnic group is excluded from the central government for sub-
Saharan African countries. 6XGGXWK¶VGDWDVHWRQPLOLWDU\SXUJHVSURYLGHVLQIRUPDWLRQ
on when autocratic leaders purge rival military officers from the regime for coup-proofing 
purposes for the years 1969-2003. De Bruin (2015) introduces a new counterbalancing measure 
that, unlike the existing data based on the Military Balance, systematically identifies whether 
security forces are independent from military command and are therefore capable of 
counterbalancing the military. Such data would open up opportunities to explore new research 
questions about whether some coup-proofing strategies are more effective in reducing coup 
risks than others or whether some coup-proofing strategies are more prone to increasing 
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future threats from rebel groups. 
Finally, as suggested by McMahon and Slantchev (2015), another step forward would be to 
investigate whether the nature of the trade-offs between protection by the militaries and protection 
from the militaries depends on whether the external threat emanates from domestic or international 
adversaries. Recent empirical evidence on the relationship between civil and international wars 
and coup attempts do indeed indicate that there are important differences. Bell and Sudduth (2015) 
find that ongoing civil war increases the probability of coup attempts and that more severe threats 
posed by rebels increase the likelihood of war-time coup attempts. Meanwhile, other scholars 
find that militaries are less likely to attempt a coup during international war and militarized 
crises (Arbatli and Arbatli, 2014). What accounts for these different effects?  Desh (1999) 
suggests one possible explanation. He asserts that civilians have greater control over their 
militaries when the state confronts grave international threats, and less control when they face 
domestic threats. However, the exact mechanisms and factors that produce these outcomes are not 
yet clear. More comparative research is needed to explore how leaders develop strategies of 
dealing with their militaries as well as how militaries calculate their willingness to remain loyal 
under these different conditions.  Still another promising avenue of future research would be to 
assess how different types of domestic threats ± whether the threat appears in the form of civil war 
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